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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,

~

Plaintiff and Respondent,

Case No.
8314

vs.

CLARENCE E. BRIDGE,

\

Defendant and Appellant.}

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant, Clarence E. Bridge, was, by a jury, found
guilty of robbery. The verdict returned on October 28th,
1954, and sentence five years to life, imposed on November
13th, 1954.
The fact that a robbery took place at the Claud Ann
Apartment at 23 North 1st West in Salt Lake City, Utah,
at approximately 11 p. m. on the night of April 19th, 1954,
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was established by the testimony of the victim, Mrs. Edna
Brennan, age seventy, (R. 21-26) and by the testimony of
D. J. McDonough, an eye witness to the crime (R. 26-28).
Neither of these witnesses placed the appellant at the scene
of the crime. However, the witness, Brennan, had a ten
year acquaintanceship with the appellant and testified that
he, appellant, knew where the safe was in her residence and
knew that she had a brown purse (R. 25). This witness
testified further that a cash box was taken from the safe;
(R. 23) that currency and checks were taken from pigeon
holes in the safe (R. 23). The witness, McDonough, testified that Milton B. Head, an accomplice, asked the victim,
"where her brown purse was?" (R. 27).
The accomplice, Milton B. Head, testified that he had
been told about the brown purse; (R. 43) that appellant,
Bridge, told him it was supposed to contain the money inside the safe (R. 43).
Salt Lake Police Officer Don B. Pearson testified that
he investigated the robbery; (R. 29) that he took a statement from appellant; (R. 29) that he informed appellant
of his rights in connection with the making of such statement; (R. 30) that he obtained the statement without threat
or force; (R. 30) that he promised appellant no reward;
(R. 30) that appellant signed the statement (R. 31). Counsel for appellant objected to the admission of this statement (confession) in evidence "on constitutional grounds
on which I will lay a foundation at a later time" (R. 31).
The objection was overruled. This police officer further
testified that the appellant told him that the cash box taken
from the Claud Ann Apartment, from the victim, was in
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a culvert on 6th South and 2nd West (R. 32). On crossexamination Officer Pearson said that appellant had made
requests for an attorney; (R. 33, 35, 36) that appellant
was told to make his request to the jailer (R. 33).
Police Officer Dean Anderson, called as a witness for
the State, testified that he recovered the cash box under
the culvert just east of 2nd West on 6th South, at 260 West
6th South (R. 39).
Appellant moved for dismissal of the cause; ( R. 55)
for judgment non obstante verdicto (R. 58). Both motions
were denied.
The court did not instruct the jury that the testimony
of an accomplice need be corroborated by other evidence before a conviction can be had on such testimony standing
alone. (Sec. 77-31-8, U. C. A. 1953.) The appellant joined
with the State in taking no exception to the court's instructions.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE ADMISSION IN EVIDENCE OF APPELLANT'S CONFESSION WAS NOT VIOLATIVE
OF THE 14TH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, THE
PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 12, OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, NOR TITLE
77, CHAPTER 15, SECTION 1, UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED, 1953.
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POINT II
THE APPELLANT WAS NOT CONVICTED
SOLELY UPON THE UNCORROBORATED
TESTIMONY OF AN ACCOMPLICE AND THE
CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE VERDICT OF THE
JURY.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ADMISSION IN EVIDENCE OF APPELLANT'S CONFESSION WAS NOT VIOLATIVE
OF THE 14TH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, THE
PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 12, OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, NOR TITLE
77, CHAPTER 15, SECTION 1, UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED, 1953.
There is nothing in the record in this cause to indicate
that the confession of the defendant was not voluntarily
given. There is nothing in the record that said confession
was obtained by force, fear, coercion or promise of immunity or benefit. The record does not show that there
was any objection to the admission in evidence of the confession except "on constitutional grounds." This objection
was properly overruled. The record clearly shows, as does
the confession itself, that appellant was fully advised as
to his rights before making the statement.
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Appellant here complains of a violation of due process
of law as guaranteed by the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, and Article I, Section 12, of
the Constitution of Utah; the latter as augmented by the
Utah Code of Civil Procedure, Section 77-15-1, 1953. Specifically, in that appellant was denied counsel.
The requirement of the 14th Amendment is for a fair
trial. Massey v. Moore, Warden (1954), Advance Reports
of the Supreme Court of the United States, Lawyers' Edition, Vol. 99, No. 3, page 117; citing Betts v. Brady, 316
U.S. 455, 462, 86 L. Ed. 1595, 1601, 62 S. Ct. 1252.
As to the statutory and constitutional provisions of
the State of Utah, above set forth and relied upon by appellant, this Court has considered and resolved the question
as to the right to counsel before a defendant may be questioned by police officers. The Court said:
"\Ve have found no case which holds that a
confession is not admissible in evidence merely because the defendant was immature and without the
advise of counsel, friends or relatives [as appellant
here argues] when it was made and Mares v. Hill,
supra, considered this very problem and held that
those facts did not make the confession inadmissible
in evidence." (Comment added.)
And,

"* * * the mere fact that a confession is made
while the accused is in the custody of the police officers does not render it inadmissible."
State v. Braasch, ... Utah ... , 229 P. 2d 289.
Appellant does not contend that the confession was not
voluntarily given and claims no error in this respect.
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POINT II
THE APPELLANT WAS NOT CONVICTED
SOLELY UPON THE UNCORROBORATED
TESTIMONY OF AN ACCOMPLICE AND THE
CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE VERDICT OF THE
JURY.
Appellant says:
"It is the contention of defendant that Section
77-31-18, Utah Code Ann. (1953), which is the general statute as to testimony of accomplices and the
need for corroboration of such testimony in order
to support a conviction is applicable in the instant
case."

The State joins in this contention. The State also concedes
that the witnesses, Brennan, McDonough, Officer Anderson
and Officer Pearson, were not able to independently place
the appellant at the scene of the crime. However, the testimony of the accomplice, Head, shows that appellant drove
the car to the Claud Ann Apartments, where the offense
was consummated, and drove the car away when the perpetrators of the crime fled. The part played by appellant
in the robbery was that of driver of the get-away car. This
witness also testified that he had knowledge of a brown
purse which was supposed to contain the money and that
he received this information from the appellant (R. 43).
This testimony was corroborated by that of the witness,
McDonough, who said that he heard this accomplice ask
the victim "where her brown purse was." The question of
what amounts to sufficient corroboration has been many
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times before this Court. In the case of State
Utah 365, 120 P. 2d 285, this Court held:

v. Erwin, 101

"This Court has held this corroboration need
not go to all the material facts testified to by the
accomplice (State v. Stewart, 57 Ut. 224, 193 P.
855) ; that the corroborative evidence need not be
sufficient in itself to support a conviction; it may
be slight and entitled to little consideration. People
v. Lee, 2 Utah 441; State v. Spender, 15 Utah 149,
49 p. 302. * * *
"On the other hand, the corroborating evidence
must implicate the defendant in the offense and be
consistent with his guilt and inconsistent with his
innocence, and must do more than cast a grave suspicion on him, and all of this must be without the
aid of the testimony of the accomplice. State v. Lay,
38 Utah 143, 110 P. 986; State v. Butterfield, 70
Utah 529, 261 P. 804; State v. Park, 44 Utah 360,
140 P. 768; State v. Kimball, 45 Utah 443, 146 P.
313; State v. Powell, 45 Utah 193, 143 P. 588; State
v. Bridwell, 48 Utah 97, 158 P. 710; State v. Baum,
47 Utah 7, 151 P. 518; State v. Frisby, 49 Utah 227,
162 P. 616; State v. Elmer, 49 Utah 6, 161 P. 167;
State v. Gardner, 83 Utah 145, 27 P. 2d 51.
"The corroborative evidence of an accomplice,
unlike proof of corpus delicti, may consist in the admissions of the accused. * * *"
See Wharton on Criminal Evidence, 11th Edition, Volume
2, Section 752, 753, 7 48, 7 46 and 754, pages 1257 to 1273
inclusive. See also 25 A. L. R. 886; 87 A. L. R. 767; State v.
Wade, 66 Utah 276, 241 P. 838; State v. Laris, 78 Utah
183, 2 P. 2d 243; State v. Caroles, 74 Utah 94, 277 P. 203;
State v. Cox, 74 Utah 149, 277 P. 972; People v. Derenzo,
46 Cal. App. 2d 411, 115 P. 2d 858; and People v. Negra,
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208 Cal. 64, 280 P. 354. In the recent case of State v. Vigil,
. . . Utah ... , 260 P. 2d 539, the Court stated the rule
thusly:

"* * * the corroborating evidence must connect
the defendant with the commission of the offense,
State v. Lay, 38 Utah 143, 110 P. 986; and be consistent with his guilt and inconsistent with his innocence, State v. Butterfield, 70 Utah 529, 261 P. 804.
The corroborating evidence must do more than cast
a grave suspicion on the defendant and it must do
all of these things without the aid of the testimony
of the accomplice."
In the case at bar, the corroborating evidence connects
the appellant with the con1mission of the offense, is consistent with his guilt and inconsistent with his innocence
and casts upon him more than a grave suspicion.

We are a ware of tl;J.e fact that the court did not instruct
the jury that an accomplice's testimony must be corroborated. This was not prejudicial error. In State v. Hall, 112
Utah 272, 186 P. 2d 970, in an unanimous opinion, Mr.
Justice Wolfe, concurring specially and directly on this
issue, the Court said :
"Now as to the failure of the court to instruct
on the law applicable to the testimony of an accomplice. Our Code, section 105-32-18, U. C. A. 1943,
prohibits the finding of an accused guilty upon the
evidence of an accomplice unless that evidence is
corroborated. It reads:
'A conviction shall not be had on the testimony of an accomplice, unless he is corroborated
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by other evidence, which in itself and without
the aid of the testimony of the accomplice tends
to connect the defendant with the commission
of the offense ; and the corroboration shall not
be sufficient, if it merely shows the commission
of the offense or the circumstances thereof.'

* * * Counsel * * * submitted no requests
for instructions nor did he take any exceptions to
any instructions given by the lower court, nor to
the court's refusal or failure to give any particular
kind of an instruction.
"Under the circumstances there is nothing for
us to do but affirm the judgment of the lower court."
Mr. Justice Wolfe in his concurring opinion went on to say:

"* * * Counsel, as an officer of the court, has
the duty as a specialist on the case, which he should
be, to point out a failure by the court to instruct on
a salient material proposition of law. He is a backstop in that regard. If he does not do so his client
cannot afterward complain that the instructions
were insufficient or incomplete.
"However, I have a doubt as to whether the
provisions of Sec. 105-32-18, U. C. A. 1943, should
be brought to the attention of the jury. It certainly
is for the court to say, in the first instance, whether
there is corroborating evidence. If there is, the
court will overrule a motion for nonsuit, or for a
directed verdict. But whether after that the court
should instruct the jury, and thus place on it the
sometimes difficult task of differentiating corroborating testimony from other testimony, presents to
me a serious question. * * * I need only signify

my doubt as to the other point in order that it will
not be assumed that it escaped notice and, more important, that it will not be hereafter argued that by
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implication this court held that an instruction as to
the necessity for corroborating evidence was necessary." (Emphasis added.)

CONCLUSION
The verdict and the sentence of the court below should
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
. E. R. CALLISTER,
Attorney General,
WALTER L. BUDGE,
Assistant Attorney General,
Attorneys for Respondent.
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